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A B S T R A C T   
According to the dual model, outgroup members can be dehumanized by being thought to possess uniquely and 
characteristically human traits to a lesser extent than ingroup members. However, previous research on this topic 
has tended to investigate the attribution of human traits that are socially desirable in nature such as warmth, 
civility and rationality. As a result, it has not yet been possible to determine whether this form of dehumanization 
is distinct from intergroup preference and stereotyping. We first establish that participants associate undesirable 
(e.g., corrupt, jealous) as well as desirable (e.g., open-minded, generous) traits with humans. We then go on to 
show that participants tend to attribute desirable human traits more strongly to ingroup members but unde-
sirable human traits more strongly to outgroup members. This pattern holds across three different intergroup 
contexts for which dehumanization effects have previously been reported: political opponents, immigrants and 
criminals. Taken together, these studies cast doubt on the claim that a trait-based account of representing others 
as ‘less human’ holds value in the study of intergroup bias.   
1. Introduction 
In a social world characterised by the continued prevalence of 
prejudiced attitudes, systematic discrimination and social division, un-
derstanding the psychological causes of intergroup bias is essential. The 
construct of dehumanization is commonly invoked to explain intergroup 
biases. Although there are different conceptions of dehumanization 
within the literature, proponents of the view typically hold that some 
outgroup members are perceived as less human than are ingroup 
members (Harris & Fiske, 2006; Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al., 2000, 
2001). The claim that dehumanization is associated with intergroup 
harm has been extremely influential and is broadly accepted in many 
areas of social psychology, social neuroscience and philosophy (Haslam, 
2019; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Smith, 2011, 2016; Tirrell, 2012). For 
example, Haslam recently noted “The research literature reveals so many 
associations between dehumanization, assessed in a wide variety of ways, 
and various forms of maltreatment that strong links between dehumanization 
and violence are difficult to deny” (Haslam, 2019, pp. 134–135). 
Psychological models tend to propose that dehumanization exists 
along a continuum (Harris & Fiske, 2006; Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al., 
2000, 2001). In cases of extreme dehumanization, outgroup members 
may be likely to fall victim to severe harm such as genocide, torture and 
rape (Haslam, 2019; Haslam & Loughnan, 2016). Evidence for this type 
of dehumanization has typically been drawn from historical documents. 
For example, propaganda in which the victims of genocide are compared 
to rats, lice or snakes (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Smith, 2011, 2014, 
2016; Tirrell, 2012). Social psychologists and social neuroscientists 
propose that, in more subtle forms of dehumanization, outgroup mem-
bers are perceived as somewhat less human than are ingroup members 
(Harris & Fiske, 2006; Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al., 2003; Leyens, 
Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007). Evidence for more subtle 
forms of dehumanization has typically come from lab-based research. 
Subtly dehumanized groups are thought to be shown less empathy, less 
forgiveness for perceived wrongdoing, and are less likely to receive help 
(Haslam & Loughnan, 2014, 2016; Vaes, Leyens, Paola Paladino, & Pires 
Miranda, 2012; Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003; 
Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2002). These forms of dehumanization are 
thought to be widespread in society (reviewed in Haslam & Stratemeyer, 
2016; Leyens, 2009; Vaes et al., 2012). 
More recently, researchers have attempted to bridge the gap between 
* Corresponding author at: Department of Psychology, University of York, York YO10 5DD, United Kingdom. 
E-mail addresses: Florence.enock@York.ac.uk (F.E. Enock), Jonathan.Flavell@York.ac.uk (J.C. Flavell), Steven.Tipper@York.ac.uk (S.P. Tipper), Harriet.Over@ 
York.ac.uk (H. Over).  
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
Cognition 
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/cognit 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104682 
Received 8 October 2020; Received in revised form 22 February 2021; Accepted 15 March 2021   
Cognition 212 (2021) 104682
2
the study of extreme dehumanization and its more subtle psychological 
forms by developing a blatant dehumanization scale (Kteily, Bruneau, 
Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015). In studies using this method, participants are 
asked to placedifferent social groups on a scale depicting silhouettes 
ranging from early human ancestors reminiscent of apes through to 
modern humans. Empirical research has shown that certain outgroups 
are rated as less human-like on this scale (Bruneau, Kteily, & Laustsen, 
2018; Kteily et al., 2015). For example, in a US sample, Arabs and 
Muslims were amongst groups rated as significantly less evolved than a 
group labelled Americans. Furthermore, ratings on this scale were 
associated with wider attitudes. For example, the extent to which Arabs 
were ‘blatantly dehumanized’ predicted reduced support for Arab 
immigration, lower empathy for an Arab individual, and even 
endorsement of direct harm towards Arabs (Kteily et al., 2015). 
Three psychological models of subtle dehumanization have been 
particularly influential. A social neuroscience perspective proposes that 
dehumanization is best characterised as a lack of mental state attribu-
tion. According to this perspective, to the extent a group is dehuman-
ized, they are viewed as lacking beliefs, desires and intentions (Harris & 
Fiske, 2006; Harris & Fiske, 2011). Leyens and colleagues (Leyens et al., 
2000, 2001) offer an alternative characterisation, known as infrahu-
manisation theory, that focuses on particular types of mental state 
attribution. According to this view, subtle dehumanization occurs when 
outgroup members are perceived to experience complex secondary 
(uniquely human) emotions to a lesser extent than do ingroup members 
(e.g., Demoulin, Pozo, & Leyens, 2009; Leyens et al., 2003; Leyens et al., 
2007; Vaes et al., 2012). 
A third highly influential account of dehumanization is known as the 
dual model of dehumanization and focuses on trait attributions (Haslam, 
2006). While this model hypothesises that dehumanization occurs in 
both interpersonal and intergroup processes, our primary interest in this 
paper is the predictions it makes about intergroup bias. The dual model 
builds on infrahumanisation theory to offer an account in which there 
are two different forms of (or routes to) dehumanization. Groups are 
animalistically or mechanistically dehumanized to the extent they are 
denied particular character traits. 
One advantage of the dual model over other theories of dehuman-
ization is that it is based on empirical research into the lay characteri-
sation of the concept human. To determine traits most associated with 
the concept of humanness, participants were asked to rate the extent to 
which eighty pre-defined personality traits were uniquely human (‘this 
characteristic is exclusively or uniquely human: it does not apply to 
other species’) or human nature (‘this characteristic is an aspect of 
human nature’) (Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005). On the 
basis of participants’ answers, two senses of humanness were proposed: 
uniquely human characteristics, which separate humans from other 
species, and human nature characteristics, which are supposedly typi-
cally or essentially human. Though human nature traits were initially 
defined as those that are fundamental to humans and independent of any 
comparison category, they are also proposed to be akin to those that 
distinguish humans from robots and other machines (Haslam, 2006). 
Discussing the model, Haslam notes “The animalistic form of dehuman-
ization rests on a direct contrast between humans and animals, but in the 
mechanistic form, although the relevant sense of humanness is non-
comparative (HN), humans can be contrasted with machines. The shared, 
typical, or core properties of humanness are also those that distinguish us 
from automata” (Haslam, 2006, p. 258). According to this model, 
uniquely human characteristics can be summarised as civility, refine-
ment, moral sensibility, rationality, and maturity. A denial of these traits 
is considered animalistic dehumanization, a perception of another per-
son or social group as uncultured, coarse, amoral, irrational, and 
childlike. Human nature characteristics can be summarised as emotional 
responsiveness, interpersonal warmth, cognitive openness, agency, and 
depth. A denial of these traits is considered mechanistic dehumaniza-
tion, a perception of another person or social group as inert, cold, rigid, 
passive, and superficial (Haslam, 2006). 
Empirical work examining the dual model of dehumanization sug-
gests that some social groups may be animalistically dehumanized 
whilst others may be mechanistically dehumanized. For example, 
Loughnan and Haslam (2007) suggested, based on implicit measures, 
that participants implicitly associated artists more strongly with human 
nature traits (such as curious and friendly) than uniquely human traits 
(such as organised and polite), whilst the reverse was true for busi-
nesspeople. Further, nonhuman animal terms (such as cattle and pri-
mates) were associated with artists more than businesspeople, while 
automata terms (such as android and computer) were associated more 
with businesspeople than artists. Loughnan and Haslam argue this shows 
subtle animalistic dehumanization of artists and subtle mechanistic 
dehumanization of businesspeople. Other research has suggested that 
both Anglo-Australian and Ethnic-Chinese participants in Australia 
tended to mechanistically dehumanize Ethnic-Chinese people, ascribing 
them human nature qualities to a lesser extent than Anglo-Australians, 
but tended to animalistically dehumanize Anglo-Australians, ascribing 
them uniquely human qualities to a lesser extent than Ethnic Chinese 
people. The researchers proposed that different cultural groups may 
subtly dehumanize an outgroup along one dimension of humanness, but 
subtly dehumanize an ingroup along the other (Bain, Park, Kwok, & 
Haslam, 2009). In related work, Italian participants seemed to animal-
istically dehumanize Haitians but mechanistically dehumanize Japanese 
people. These two respective forms of dehumanization purportedly 
decreased willingness to help in relation to the earthquakes in both 
countries (Andrighetto, Baldissarri, Lattanzio, Loughnan, & Volpato, 
2014). 
Recently, the logic underlying the dual model of dehumanization has 
been called into question (Bloom, 2017; Lang, 2010, 2020; Manne, 
2016, 2018; Over, 2020a; Smith, 2014, 2016). Over (2020a, 2020b) 
points out that the traits thought to characterise human uniqueness and 
human nature are typically socially desirable in nature. To be conceived 
of as civilised, rational, warm and cognitively open, for example, is 
generally positive. Apparent evidence for the dual model of dehuman-
ization may, then, be better explained in terms of ingroup preference 
and stereotyping. Importantly, antisocial traits such as jealousy, arro-
gance and selfishness also appear to be characteristic of humans but 
seem unlikely to be attributed more strongly to ingroup than outgroup 
members (Manne, 2016; Over, 2020a; Over, 2020b). 
Prior work that has measured outgroup dehumanization based on the 
dual model has not rigorously separated human specific characteristics 
from ones that are perceived as socially desirable. For example, one 
study measured dehumanization of criminals by having participants rate 
different kinds of offenders (i.e. white collar, violent or child molesters) 
on statements assessing human nature and human uniqueness. Human 
nature statements included ‘I felt like the person in the story was 
emotional, like they were responsive and warm’, and ‘I felt like the 
person in the story was mechanical and cold, like a robot’ (reversed). 
Uniquely human statements included ‘I felt like the person in the story 
was rational and logical, like they were intelligent’ and ‘I felt like the 
person in the story lacked self-restraint, like an animal’ (reversed). 
These measures claimed to show criminals to be dehumanized differ-
entially based on crime, and that dehumanization predicted attitudes 
such as how severely the offender should be punished (Bastian, Denson, 
& Haslam, 2013). However, because the human characteristics were all 
positive, desirable ones, it is difficult to separate ‘dehumanization’ from 
dislike. 
Related research measured animalistic dehumanization of sex of-
fenders by asking participants to indicate the extent to which human 
words (humanity, person, people, civilian) and animal words (creature, 
beast, animal, mongrel) described rapists and paedophiles. Here, the 
extent to which people associated the offenders with animal words 
predicted attitudes such as reduced support for rehabilitation and longer 
punishment sentences (Viki, Fullerton, Raggett, Tait, & Wiltshire, 2012). 
A similar measure suggested that the extent to which Christians ani-
malistically dehumanized Muslims predicted advocacy of torture 
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towards Muslim prisoners of war (Viki, Osgood, & Phillips, 2013). These 
tests have also been used to infer dehumanization of political opponents 
and gay men (Fasoli et al., 2016; Pacilli, Roccato, Pagliaro, & Russo, 
2016). However, as noted before, word valence was not appropriately 
controlled for. Describing someone as ‘beast’ or ‘mongrel’ is usually 
more derogatory than describing someone as ‘person’ or ‘civilian’. 
Mechanistic dehumanization has been measured by asking partici-
pants how compassionate they believe outgroup members to be. 
Amongst samples of Palestinians and Jewish-Israelis, this measure pre-
dicted support for peaceful compared to violent conflict resolution 
strategies (Leidner, Castano, & Ginges, 2013). However, compassion is 
undoubtedly a prosocial and desirable quality. It is conceivable that 
people who more strongly view outgroup members as having compas-
sion also like them more. 
1.1. The present work 
These critiques suggest a plausible alternative account of the existing 
data that appear to support the dual model: outgroups are perceived to 
possess uniquely human attributes to a similar extent as ingroups, but 
that these attributes are typically negative and antisocial in character. In 
this paper, we empirically assess the claims of the dual model of dehu-
manization against this alternative hypothesis. 
We first revisit prior accounts that have offered lay conceptions of 
‘humanness’ (Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al., 2005; Haslam, Bastian, & 
Bissett, 2004) and show that people tend to associate socially undesir-
able as well as desirable traits with the concept human. In seven ex-
periments, we then examine whether outgroup members are attributed 
uniquely human traits to a lesser extent even when those attributes are 
controlled in terms of valence. Across three different intergroup contexts 
in which dehumanization effects have previously been reported (polit-
ical opponents, immigrants and criminals), we measure attributions of 
human specific traits to ingroups and outgroups. By rigorously con-
trolling for trait valence within our experimental designs, we test 
whether the dual model of dehumanization explains intergroup biases in 
cognition over and above effects of ingroup favouritism and outgroup 
dislike. 
1.2. Data collection 
All studies took place online and were created and administered 
using Qualtrics (https://www.qualtrics.com), with participants 
recruited through Prolific (https://www.prolific.co). Informed consent 
was obtained at the start of each online session according to approved 
ethical procedures and participants were compensated at an approxi-
mate rate of £7.50 per hour. Power analyses were conducted using 
MorePower 6.0.4. Link to pre-registration documents and raw data for 
all studies can be found at: https://osf.io/yp8wc/ 
2. Pretest: How to measure the lay concept of ‘human’ 
We suggest the dual model of dehumanization over-represents pos-
itive aspects of humanity and under-represents negative aspects of hu-
manity because of ways in which the content of the lay category ‘human’ 
was measured. First, when participants were asked to rate traits for how 
uniquely or typically human they were, several potentially important 
undesirable terms likely to be viewed as typically human were omitted 
from the stimulus set. For example, traits such as jealous, selfish and 
corrupt were not included. Second, the way in which participants were 
asked to rate the traits may have inadvertently biased participants to 
focus on the more positive aspects of humanity. Participants rated ‘The 
extent to which each characteristic was exclusively or uniquely human 
(does not apply to other species)’ and ‘The extent to which each char-
acteristic is an aspect of human nature’ (Haslam et al., 2005). However, 
research in the cognitive psychology of categorisation has long 
demonstrated that attributes that appear typical of a category vary 
depending on the context such that that our representations are not 
static, but are constantly changing (Medin & Smith, 1984; Smith & 
Medin, 1981; Yee & Thompson-Schill, 2016). The set of attributes that 
are judged unique to humans is likely to depend on the particular 
comparison. In other words, if we ask participants to compare humans to 
other species then a different set of uniquely human attributes may 
emerge than when we ask participants to compare humans to, for 
example, angels. Furthermore, it is likely that more socially undesirable 
traits such as jealousy and spite will be listed as uniquely human in the 
latter context (Over, 2020a). 
In order to build understanding of the range of traits that people 
associate with the category human, we utilised a similar method to prior 
related work (Haslam et al., 2005) and introduced a broader range of 
undesirable trait terms. We then asked participants to rate sixty traits on 
how strongly they applied to humans in three contexts. One scale asked 
how uniquely human the trait was compared to other species, directly 
following Haslam et al. (2005). Another asked how uniquely human the 
trait was compared to robots, following the dual model’s suggestion that 
human nature traits distinguish us from robots and other machines. 
Haslam and colleagues detail this parallel in much of their prior work, 
for example, they note “Our work… proposes two forms of dehumanization, 
in which people are denied uniquely human attributes and likened to animals, 
or denied human nature attributes and likened to robots” (Haslam, 
Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, & Suitner, 2008, p. 248). A third asked how 
uniquely human the trait was compared to angels, in order to obtain the 
more negative or socially undesirable qualities associated with hu-
manness in certain contexts. 
Our main aim in this pretest was not to provide an exhaustive ac-
count of the lay concept of ‘human’ as Haslam and colleagues sought to 
do – a challenging task by any standard. Rather, our aim was consid-
erably more modest – to show accounts of humanness are likely subject 
to variation depending on context, and to obtain a list of traits rated as 
highly characteristic of humans as a basis from which to choose stimuli 
for subsequent studies. 
2.1. Methods 
2.1.1. Participants 
Thirty participants were included (12 female, 18 male), aged be-
tween 18 and 51 (Mean age = 27.3, SD = 7.85). One participant failed 
one or more attention checks and their data was excluded and replaced. 
2.1.2. Materials 
We chose sixty trait words from several sources to reflect a broad 
range of attributes. An approximate equal number of desirable and un-
desirable qualities were included. For consistency with previous work, 
we included terms from Haslam et al. (2004, 2005) and also the five 
summary ‘uniquely human’ and ‘human nature’ qualities along with 
their opposites from the dual model (Haslam, 2006). 
The words we included were: aggressive, arrogant, bitter, calm, 
capable, civilised, cold, controlling, corrupt, creative, cruel, cultured, 
cunning, curious, cynical, deceptive, disciplined, dominant, efficient, 
emotional, energetic, error-prone, ethical, forgiving, generous, gentle, 
genuine, helpful, honest, humble, immature, impulsive, inflexible, 
innocent, intellectual, irrational, jealous, kind, knowledgeable, mature, 
modest, moral, open-minded, passive, rational, refined, selfish, sneaky, 
sophisticated, spiteful, stingy, stupid, submissive, superficial, trusting, 
uncultured, unrefined, unsophisticated, warm, wise. 
Participants rated these sixty words on three separate sliding scales 
which asked:  
i. How much does this apply to humans compared to other species?  
ii. How much does this apply to humans compared to robots?  
iii. How much does this apply to humans compared to angels? 
Each scale ranged from −50 Just [comparison category] to +50 Just 
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humans, with 0 indicating Equally to [comparison category] and humans, 
though participants could not see the scoring numbers. In line with the 
Dual Model, we were most interested in finding traits perceived to be 
shared with the comparison category (scoring close to 0) and emotions 
that were strongly associated with just humans (scoring close to +50). 
The scales were presented in three separate blocks and the order of 
completion was counterbalanced. The sixty items within each block 
were randomised and one attention check per block was also included 
approximately halfway through, for example Please indicate ‘just 
humans’. Additionally, participants completed two short scales to assess 
attitudes to each comparison category. The order of items participants 
responded to (other species/angels/robots) was randomised. 
Table 1 
Pretest results: Means for the trait words on all three scales, ordered from most to least human on each.  
Humans v. other species Humans v. robots Humans v. angels 
Trait word M SE Trait word M SE Trait word M SE 
Cynical 40.9 2.65 Emotional 47.1 1.30 Selfish 43.6 2.11 
Corrupt 39.0 4.00 Jealous 40.6 4.32 Corrupt 42.3 2.44 
Cultured 38.3 2.91 Selfish 39.1 4.10 Aggressive 41.3 2.51 
Open-minded 33.3 4.00 Stingy 38.6 3.39 Jealous 39.8 2.50 
Controlling 33.2 3.55 Generous 38.4 3.01 Stingy 39.3 2.75 
Arrogant 32.4 3.53 Impulsive 38.3 3.22 Cruel 39.2 2.86 
Civilised 31.3 5.07 Cynical 38.1 3.03 Error-prone 38.5 2.96 
Sophisticated 30.3 4.43 Open-minded 37.6 3.76 Spiteful 37.8 3.02 
Intellectual 29.8 4.24 Warm 37.6 3.01 Bitter 37.0 3.46 
Superficial 28.7 5.73 Bitter 37.2 3.56 Cynical 37.0 3.28 
Knowledgeable 28.2 4.21 Spiteful 37.0 4.15 Arrogant 35.3 4.43 
Bitter 28.1 4.10 Arrogant 34.9 4.07 Immature 34.9 4.04 
Stingy 27.2 3.69 Kind 34.3 4.58 Impulsive 34.2 3.71 
Moral 27.1 5.21 Cultured 34.2 4.37 Deceptive 33.8 4.41 
Refined 27.0 3.90 Sneaky 33.3 4.04 Stupid 33.3 3.05 
Selfish 26.4 4.07 Moral 33.1 3.81 Unsophisticated 31.9 3.64 
Spiteful 25.7 4.12 Cunning 33.1 3.45 Cunning 30.7 4.01 
Humble 25.5 4.13 Cruel 32.8 3.79 Irrational 30.7 4.94 
Wise 23.6 4.92 Creative 32.7 4.43 Cold 30.7 3.99 
Creative 23.5 4.10 Mature 32.3 3.97 Unrefined 30.4 3.63 
Jealous 23.4 3.70 Aggressive 32.2 4.23 Superficial 29.6 4.88 
Rational 23.3 5.36 Curious 32.2 4.75 Emotional 28.1 4.48 
Emotional 22.2 3.87 Dominant 32.1 3.60 Curious 26.4 4.54 
Ethical 21.2 5.78 Forgiving 32.0 4.63 Sneaky 26.3 5.43 
Cruel 18.3 4.30 Civilised 31.8 3.94 Energetic 22.6 4.73 
Cunning 18.1 4.12 Humble 30.6 4.94 Controlling 20.7 5.25 
Mature 17.8 3.94 Deceptive 29.8 3.88 Creative 19.7 5.36 
Modest 17.5 5.03 Corrupt 28.8 4.99 Open-minded 19.2 5.85 
Dominant 15.9 3.65 Immature 28.0 5.77 Dominant 18.2 5.86 
Generous 14.7 4.23 Irrational 27.8 4.81 Uncultured 17.7 6.12 
Deceptive 13.6 3.60 Gentle 27.4 4.37 Cultured 16.4 5.44 
Forgiving 12.0 5.02 Wise 26.0 4.58 Civilised 15.6 5.19 
Gentle 11.3 4.19 Stupid 23.1 4.80 Submissive 13.9 5.40 
Kind 10.4 4.00 Ethical 22.7 5.02 Intellectual 12.5 5.36 
Capable 8.8 4.22 Modest 22.6 6.46 Inflexible 10.6 6.29 
Honest 8.8 5.51 Controlling 21.7 5.41 Mature 8.6 6.04 
Immature 8.7 4.43 Trusting 19.7 5.70 Capable 7.9 4.96 
Error-prone 8.2 5.01 Genuine 18.8 5.86 Rational 7.6 5.87 
Disciplined 7.6 4.38 Intellectual 13.8 5.63 Efficient 4.3 6.47 
Helpful 7.5 4.54 Energetic 13.0 5.66 Sophisticated 2.4 5.77 
Efficient 7.3 4.50 Unsophisticated 11.3 5.32 Passive 2.0 6.17 
Cold 5.9 3.93 Superficial 9.0 5.90 Disciplined 1.2 6.10 
Warm 5.8 4.15 Refined 7.3 5.32 Generous 1.2 5.78 
Irrational 5.6 4.66 Error-prone 5.4 5.42 Modest 1.0 5.82 
Aggressive 3.8 3.15 Honest 4.2 5.78 Refined −0.3 6.30 
Calm 3.6 3.36 Innocent 2.2 6.25 Moral −1.0 6.45 
Genuine 3.2 5.17 Sophisticated 1.1 6.05 Warm −2.4 6.23 
Impulsive 3.1 4.22 Unrefined 0.8 5.68 Knowledgeable −4.2 6.41 
Sneaky 0.8 4.03 Rational 0.4 5.89 Wise −4.4 5.50 
Inflexible 0.7 4.55 Knowledgeable −0.2 4.94 Ethical −5.5 6.61 
Curious 0.6 3.57 Uncultured −1.8 6.73 Innocent −7.7 6.52 
Stupid 0.6 5.14 Capable −3.2 5.14 Humble −9.4 5.79 
Trusting −0.9 4.73 Calm −3.6 7.08 Helpful −9.4 6.33 
Energetic −3.2 3.49 Helpful −5.8 5.03 Trusting −9.7 5.89 
Passive −4.7 3.64 Passive −8.9 6.19 Gentle −10.5 5.57 
Unsophisticated −5.0 5.91 Cold −11.2 6.02 Genuine −10.8 6.50 
Submissive −6.4 4.41 Submissive −14.2 5.68 Forgiving −11.8 6.17 
Unrefined −8.8 5.14 Disciplined −14.4 5.77 Kind −13.4 5.60 
Uncultured −11.9 6.28 Inflexible −19.3 5.79 Honest −16.8 6.29 
Innocent −13.3 5.22 Efficient −21.6 3.90 Calm −16.9 5.75 
Mean (M) scores and standard error of the mean (SE) are presented alongside each word (+50 indicated the word only applies to humans, and −50 indicated the word 
only applies to the comparison category). A different yet overlapping set of qualities emerged depending on the comparison category. There were an approximately 
equal number of desirable and undesirable characteristics for the other species and robots comparisons, but almost all were undesirable for the angels comparisons. 
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2.1.3. Design and data presentation 
Every participant rated each trait on the three comparison scales. We 
present the mean ratings for the sixty traits from most to least human on 
the three scales (Table 1). 
2.1.4. Procedure 
Participants were informed that the study aimed to help us under-
stand the ways in which people ascribe character traits and would be 
asked to rate sixty trait words on three separate scales. Once informed 
consent was obtained, brief demographic (age and gender) and 
screening (English fluency) questions were asked. Then, participants 
were taken through the three question blocks, before completing the 
final brief attitude scales towards each of the comparison categories 
(other species, angels and robots) at the end. Participants were debriefed 
and redirected back to Prolific for payment. The study took approxi-
mately ten minutes. 
2.2. Results 
For each of the three scales, words were ranked in order of score from 
highest (+50, corresponding to Just humans) to lowest (−50, corre-
sponding to Just other species/robots/angels). Means for each word on 
each scale are presented in Table 1. Distinct yet overlapping attributes 
emerged as being ‘uniquely human’ depending on the comparison 
category. When compared to other species and to robots, an approxi-
mately equal number of desirable and undesirable traits emerged. For 
example, both corrupt and cultured appear in the top five most human 
traits when compared to other species, while both jealous and generous 
appear in the top five most human traits when compared to robots. 
When compared to angels, unsurprisingly, all of the twenty most human 
traits were undesirable in valence, such as selfish, corrupt and aggres-
sive, with the possible exception of cynical and cunning, which may be 
viewed as more ambiguous. This shows the importance of the compar-
ison category when defining lay conceptions of humanness. 
2.3. Pretest discussion 
When developing the Dual Model, Haslam and colleagues (Haslam, 
2006; Haslam et al., 2004; Haslam et al., 2005) found that people 
associate broadly positive attributes with humans including civility, 
moral sensibility and warmth. This could be because human cognition 
has been shown to be biased towards representing immoral events as 
impossible (Phillips & Cushman, 2017). It could also be explained by 
features of Haslam and colleagues’ design, including which traits were 
included the stimulus set and the particular questions that were asked of 
participants. 
In a pre-registered design, we asked participants to rate sixty traits on 
how human specific they perceived each to be on three separate scales: 
comparing humans to other species, robots and angels. In comparison to 
other species and robots, approximately half of the traits rated as specific 
to humans were undesirable and half were more desirable. Consistent 
with previous conceptualisations (Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al., 2005), 
participants viewed humans as more open-minded, civilised and so-
phisticated than other animals and more generous, warm and kind than 
robots. However, humans were also thought of as more corrupt, con-
trolling and arrogant than other animals and more jealous, selfish and 
stingy than robots. When asked what distinguished humans from angels, 
the top twenty traits were almost all negative and socially undesirable. 
The particular terms viewed as unique to humans varied depending 
on the comparison point. Traits thought of as unique to humans in the 
context of animals were somewhat different from the traits thought of as 
unique to humans in the context of robots and different traits again were 
thought of as unique to humans in the context of angels. This suggests 
apparent evidence for two senses of humanness may be a product of the 
questions asked. Haslam et al. (2005) asked their participants two 
questions and found evidence for two senses of humanness. When we 
asked three questions, we found evidence for three variations. Had we 
included more comparisons (for example, to different types of animal 
such as rats, lice, swans or horses, or to different types of machine such 
as medical robots, personal computers or drones), we may have found 
evidence for further variation still (Over, 2020a). Work from cognitive 
psychology demonstrating the importance of context in representations 
applies to our understanding of humanness as well (Medin & Smith, 
1984; Smith & Medin, 1981; Yee & Thompson-Schill, 2016). A full 
investigation of which traits are most associated with humans is beyond 
the scope of this paper and we do not seek to provide an exhaustive 
account. Rather, we suggest that what counts as typical of humans varies 
with context and that current trait-based models of dehumanization are 
consequently incomplete. 
Understanding lay conceptions of humanness as undesirable as well 
as desirable opens the question as to whether there would still be evi-
dence for trait-based dehumanization of outgroups when we control for 
valence in measuring intergroup trait ascriptions. Using the uniquely 
human desirable and undesirable attributes identified in this pretest, in 
the next seven experiments, we compare the dual model of dehuman-
ization with an alternative explanation – that previously reported effects 
primarily reflect ingroup preference. 
3. Study 1: Measuring intergroup ascriptions of uniquely human 
traits 
3.1. Experiment 1a: Testing animalistic dehumanization against ingroup 
favouritism in a political group context 
In this experiment, we measure whether there is evidence for trait- 
based dehumanization of a political outgroup when we control for 
trait valence. Taking the top ten desirable words and the top ten unde-
sirable words rated as most human compared to other species in our 
pretest, we asked participants to rate how typical each one is of ingroup 
and outgroup members. The dual model of dehumanization (Haslam, 
2006) suggests that animalistic dehumanization occurs when uniquely 
human traits are assigned more strongly to the ingroup than the out-
group. In contrast, we predicted an interaction such that participants 
will tend to more strongly attribute desirable uniquely human traits to 
the ingroup, but undesirable uniquely human traits to the outgroup. 
In the first instance, we tested these hypotheses with words rated 
uniquely human in the context of other species because animalistic 
dehumanization is the most commonly studied form of dehumanization 
in intergroup settings (Demoulin et al., 2004; Haslam, 2006; Leyens 
et al., 2000, 2001; Paladino et al., 2002; Smith, 2014; Viki et al., 2006). 
We utilised a political intergroup context - Brexiters vs. Remainers. This 
was a salient intergroup divide in the UK when the study was run 
(November/December 2019) in the lead-up to the December 2019 
general election, when the outcome would affect whether the UK would 
leave the EU. We chose this pertinent intergroup division to maximise 
the chances of finding dehumanizing biases if they were prevalent in the 
population. Political group contexts feature widely in the dehumaniza-
tion literature. Blatant instances include cases of visual and verbal 
propaganda portraying the opposition in animalistic caricatures and 
metaphors (e.g., discussed in Cassese, 2020). Lab-based evidence for 
more subtle dehumanization of political outgroups has also been re-
ported (Pacilli et al., 2016). In addition, participants completed the 
blatant dehumanization scale (Kteily et al., 2015) in order to ensure that 
explicit dehumanization was observed in this context. 
3.1.1. Methods 
3.1.1.1. Participants. A sample size calculation indicated that 126 par-
ticipants would be required to detect a medium effect size (partial eta2 
0.06) for the 2 × 2 interaction with power of 0.8 and alpha 0.05. We 
tested 130 participants based on this. To be eligible for the study, 
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participants had to be fluent in English and a UK resident for the 
intergroup divide to be meaningful. Seven additional participants failed 
one or more attention checks so their data were excluded and replaced 
following our pre-registered inclusion criteria. The final sample (80 fe-
male, 49 male, 1 non-binary) were aged between 18 and 76 (Mean age 
= 33.8, SD = 13.2), 116 were British, and 101 identified as Remainers 
and 29 as Brexiters. 
3.1.1.2. Materials. We took the top ten desirable trait words and the top 
ten undesirable trait words most strongly rated as applying to humans 
compared to other species in the pretest. The desirable words were: 
cultured, open-minded, civilised, sophisticated, creative, knowledge-
able, moral, refined, humble and wise. The undesirable words were: 
corrupt, controlling, arrogant, superficial, bitter, stingy, selfish, spiteful, 
jealous, cruel. Although ‘cynical’ and ‘intellectual’ were rated as highly 
human compared to other species, these were not included as they may 
be perceived as more ambiguous in valence. Table 2 shows the trait 
items included for all experiments in Study 1. When means for the 
perceived humanness of the desirable words (overall M = 28.8 ± 3.10) 
and the undesirable words (overall M = 28.2 ± 2.51) were created for 
each participant from the pretest, a paired samples t-test found that the 
desirable and undesirable words were viewed as equally characteristic 
of humans, t(29) = 0.15, p = .883, d = 0.03. This was supported by an 
estimated Bayes factor in favour of the null model, BF01 = 5.01 and 
ensured that humanness was adequately controlled for across the two 
valence levels. 
Participants indicated the extent to which they thought each trait 
word was typical of Brexiters and of Remainers within two blocks (one 
for each group condition). For each item, participants indicated their 
response on a sliding scale from Not at all (0) to Very much so (100), with 
the midpoint Somewhat (50), though they could not see the actual 
numbers. For example, a block could begin ‘In the following questions, 
please consider the group: Brexiters’. Then, participants would respond 
to each item, such as ‘Brexiters are typically cultured’. The order of 
blocks was counterbalanced evenly across participants and the twenty 
items within block were randomised. One attention check per block was 
also included approximately halfway through, such as ‘Please indicate 
Not at all’. 
As well as the group attributions, participants completed group 
preference and blatant dehumanization scales. In the preference scale, 
participants were asked to indicate how they felt about each group 
(Brexit/Remain) using a sliding scale from Extremely Negative (0) to 
Extremely Positive (100), though again they could not see the numbers. In 
the ‘blatant dehumanization’ scale (Kteily et al., 2015), participants saw 
the ‘ascent of man’ image and were asked to indicate on a slider how 
evolved they considered the average member of each group to be, with 
0 corresponding to the ape-like silhouette at the very bottom and 100 to 
the most ‘human’ at the very top. Again the numbers were not visible. 
The order of items (whether Brexit or Remain was first) was evenly 
counterbalanced for both scales. 
3.1.1.3. Procedure. Participants were informed that the study was 
designed to help us understand the ways in which people ascribe char-
acter traits to different groups of individuals, in this case, Brexiters and 
Remainers and that it did not matter which group they supported in 
order to take part. They were instructed that they would be asked to rate 
twenty trait words on two scales, one with reference to how typical the 
trait is to Brexiters and the other with reference to how typical the trait is 
to Remainers and then would be asked to complete two scales asking 
about attitudes to each group. Once informed consent was obtained, 
brief demographic (age, gender, nationality, and whether they sup-
ported Brexit or Remain) and screening (English fluency, current 
country of residence) questions were asked. Then, participants were 
taken through the two group attribution question blocks. Following this, 
participants completed the group preference and then the blatant 
dehumanization scales. Lastly, participants were debriefed and redir-
ected back to Prolific for payment. On average, the study took under 
seven minutes. 
3.1.1.4. Design and planned data analysis. In line with our pre-registered 
analysis plan, Brexit and Remain group identities were collapsed across 
participants into simple ingroup and outgroup categories. We designed 
each of our studies in this way because we could not be confident in 
advance how many participants we would be able to recruit from each 
political group. 
There were four conditions in total in a 2 × 2 within-subjects design. 
A 2 (target group: ingroup/outgroup) x 2 (valence: desirable/undesir-
able) within subjects ANOVA tested for the interaction between group 
membership and valence in trait attributions. 
In all studies, significant interactions were followed up with planned 
comparisons measuring differences in ratings between ingroup and 
outgroup for each condition. Additionally, we measured differences in 
preference and ‘blatant dehumanization’ ratings between ingroup and 
outgroup using paired-samples t-tests. All data in the present work met 
the assumptions necessary for the parametric tests performed. 
3.1.2. Results 
3.1.2.1. Interaction between valence and group condition in trait attribu-
tions. A 2 (valence: desirable/undesirable) x 2(target group: ingroup/ 
outgroup) within subjects ANOVA tested for an interaction between 
valence and group condition in trait attributions. Counter to evidence 
for trait-based dehumanization, there was no significant main effect of 
group, F(1, 129) = 1.03, p = .313, ηp2 = 0.008, showing overall ratings to 
be of a similar magnitude for ingroup and outgroup. There was a sig-
nificant main effect of valence, F(1, 129) = 41.08, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.242, 
with higher ratings overall for desirable than for undesirable trait words. 
In line with ingroup favouritism effects, there was a significant 
Table 2 
Trait items included for each condition in Study 1.  
Experiment 1a Experiment 1b Experiment 1c 
UH compared to other species UH compared to robots UH compared to angels 
Desirable Undesirable Desirable Undesirable   
Cultured Corrupt Generous Jealous Selfish Arrogant 
Open-minded Controlling Open-minded Selfish Corrupt Immature 
Civilised Arrogant Warm Stingy Aggressive Impulsive 
Sophisticated Superficial Kind Impulsive Jealous Deceptive 
Creative Bitter Cultured Bitter Stingy Stupid 
Knowledgeable Stingy Moral Spiteful Cruel Unsophisticated 
Moral Selfish Creative Arrogant Error-prone Cunning 
Refined Spiteful Mature Sneaky Spiteful Irrational 
Humble Jealous Curious Cruel Bitter Cold 
Wise Cruel Forgiving Aggressive Cynical Unrefined 
Note: UH stands for uniquely human. 
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interaction between valence and group condition, F(1, 129) = 226.98, p 
< .001, ηp2 = 0.638, such that ratings were higher for ingroup than 
outgroup on desirable words, but higher for outgroup than ingroup on 
undesirable words (ps < 0.001) (Fig. 1A). 
3.1.2.2. Intergroup dehumanization and preference ratings. Paired sam-
ples t-tests found that participants gave significantly higher ratings for 
ingroup than outgroup both on the blatant dehumanization scale, t(129) 
= 8.029, p < .001, d = 0.70 and the group preference scale, t(129) =
20.18, p < .001, d = 1.77 (Fig. 2). This showed participants rated feeling 
more negatively towards the outgroup than the ingroup and also rated 
the outgroup as less evolved on the visual depiction of the ‘ascent of 
man’. 
3.1.3. Discussion 
The dual model of dehumanization holds that when outgroups are 
animalistically dehumanized, they are typically thought to possess 
uniquely human attributes such as civility, refinement, moral sensibility, 
rationality, and maturity to a lesser extent than ingroups (Haslam, 
2006). We tested whether there is evidence that an outgroup is ani-
malistically dehumanized when undesirable as well as desirable 
uniquely human traits are considered. We found that participants rated 
desirable traits (such as cultured) as more typical of ingroup members 
than outgroup members, but undesirable traits (such as corrupt) as more 
typical of outgroup members than ingroup members. This was the case 
even though the desirable and undesirable traits were judged by a pre-
vious set of participants to be equally typical of humans. The results 
provide no evidence for animalistic dehumanization as characterised by 
the dual model in this group context. Rather, participants show evidence 
of ingroup preference, the tendency to ascribe more desirable charac-
teristics to the ingroup than the outgroup (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 
2002; Macrae & Hewstone, 1990). 
3.2. Experiment 1b - Testing mechanistic dehumanization against ingroup 
favouritism in a political group context 
Here we extend results from Experiment 1a using another set of 
uniquely human words identified in our pretest. This time we included 
20 words rated as characteristic of humans in the context of robots. In 
doing this, we tested for evidence of mechanistic dehumanization when 
typically human but undesirable words are incorporated into the stim-
ulus set. According to the dual model, mechanistic dehumanization is 
proposed to correspond to a denial of human nature traits, which are 
those judged as characteristic of humans in a non-comparative sense. 
However, it is often noted that these are traits that distinguish humans 
from robots and other machines. Whilst Haslam and colleagues refer to 
these attributes as ‘human nature’, we call them uniquely human 
(compared to shared with robots) for consistency throughout the present 
work. As before, we took the top ten desirable and top ten undesirable 
words from those rated as most human, though this time in the context 
of robots. We tested for an intergroup bias in ascribing these terms by 
asking participants to rate how typical they believed them to be of 
ingroup and outgroup members. The dual model of dehumanization 
holds that in mechanistic dehumanization, traits that are most charac-
teristic of humans should typically be assigned more strongly to the 
ingroup than outgroup. In contrast, we predict an interaction between 
trait valence and group membership such that people more strongly 
attribute desirable traits to the ingroup and undesirable ones to the 
outgroup. Group membership was again in the form of Brexiters and 
Remainers. 
3.2.1. Methods 
3.2.1.1. Participants. Based on the same sample size calculation as for 
Experiment 1a, we tested 130 participants. Eligibility criteria were the 
same as before and data from seven participants that failed one or more 
of the attention checks was excluded and replaced. The final sample (92 
female, 36 male, 2 non-binary) were aged between 18 and 65 (Mean age 
= 33.2, SD = 10.6). 109 were British and 91 identified as Remainers and 
39 as Brexiters. 
3.2.1.2. Online survey. The questions were almost identical to those 
included in Experiment 1a but included the top ten desirable and top ten 
undesirable trait words most strongly rated as applying to humans 
compared to robots (rather than other species). The desirable words 
were: generous, open-minded, warm, kind, cultured, moral, creative, 
mature, curious, forgiving. The undesirable words were: jealous, selfish, 
stingy, impulsive, bitter, spiteful, arrogant, sneaky, cruel, aggressive. 
Some words that appeared in the top twenty in the pretest (emotional, 
cynical and cunning) were not included because of being more ambig-
uous in valence. Table 2 shows the trait items included for all experi-
ments in Study 1. As before, a paired samples t-test found no differences 
between ‘humanness’ ratings for the desirable (M = 34.4 ± 2.18) and 
undesirable (M = 36.4 ± 2.62) words, t(29) = 0.96, p = .345, d = 0.16. 
This was again supported by an estimated Bayes factor in favour of the 
null model, BF01 = 3.38. The procedure, design and planned data 
analysis exactly followed Experiment 1a. 
3.2.2. Results 
3.2.2.1. Interaction between valence and group condition in trait attribu-
tions. There was no evidence for mechanistic dehumanization - there 
was no significant main effect of group, F(1, 129) = 1.37, p = .244, ηp2 =
0.010, showing overall ratings to be of a similar magnitude for ingroup 
and outgroup. However, there was a significant main effect of valence, F 
Fig. 1. Evidence for intergroup preference but not trait-based dehumanization in Experiments 1a (A), 1b (B) and 1c (C). Mean ratings were higher for political 
ingroup members than outgroup members on desirable uniquely human traits but higher for outgroup than ingroup members on undesirable uniquely human traits. 
Error bars represent standard errors. 
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(1, 129) = 53.16, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.292, with higher ratings overall for 
desirable than for undesirable words. As we predicted, there was a sig-
nificant interaction between valence and group condition, F(1, 129) =
188.42, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.594. Ratings were higher for ingroup than 
outgroup on desirable words, but higher for outgroup than ingroup on 
undesirable words (ps <. 001) (Fig. 1B). 
3.2.2.2. Differences in dehumanization and preference ratings for ingroup 
and outgroup. Participants gave higher ratings for ingroup than out-
group both on the blatant dehumanization scale (M ingroup = 90.7 ±
1.24; M outgroup = 70.0 ± 2.65), t(129) = 8.27, p < .001, d = 0.72 and 
on the group preference scale (M ingroup = 79.0 ± 1.49; M outgroup =
29.7 ± 2.03), t(129) = 16.57, p < .001, d = 1.45 (Fig. 2). 
3.2.3. Discussion 
This study aimed to extend findings from Experiment 1a using words 
viewed as uniquely human in the context of robots. Participants gave 
higher ratings for ingroup than outgroup members on desirable words, 
but higher ratings for outgroup than ingroup members on undesirable 
words. We found no evidence of mechanistic dehumanization in this 
context, but we did find evidence for ingroup favouritism. Once again, 
participants explicitly claimed that outgroup members seemed less 
human-like than ingroup members on the blatant dehumanization scale 
(Kteily et al., 2015), confirming this is the type of social context where 
we should see the preferential attribution of human traits to ingroups 
outlined by the dual model if they occur. Taken together, Experiments 
1a and 1b suggest that political opponents in the Brexit v Remain group 
context were neither animalistically nor mechanistically dehumanized. 
3.3. Experiment 1c - Testing dehumanization against ingroup favouritism 
with a third conception of humanness 
In this study, we sought to extend the results of Experiments 1a and 
1b to a third set of words rated as uniquely human. We took the top 
twenty words from our pretest that were rated as most strongly applying 
to humans compared to angels, which were generally undesirable in 
character. Though the dual model of dehumanization does not make 
specific predictions here, an extension of its logic implies that trait-based 
dehumanization, as a separable process from ingroup favouritism, 
would entail these human specific qualities to be ascribed more strongly 
to the ingroup than the outgroup. We again predicted effects of ingroup 
favouritism – even though these words are rated as human specific, they 
are likely to be attributed more strongly to the outgroup than the 
ingroup. As before, group membership was in the form of Brexiters and 
Remainers. 
3.3.1. Methods 
3.3.1.1. Participants. For consistency with the previous two studies, 
130 participants were tested. Eligibility and exclusion criteria were the 
same as for Experiments 1a and 1b. Nine failed one or more attention 
checks so their data was excluded and replaced. The final sample (87 
female, 41 male, 1 agender) were aged between 18 and 80 (Mean age =
36.0, SD = 13.0). 111 were British, 100 identified as Remainers and 30 
as Brexiters. 
3.3.1.2. Materials and design. The questions were almost identical to 
those included in Experiments 1a and 1b but this time we included the 
top twenty words that were most strongly rated as applying to humans 
compared to angels in the pretest. The words were: selfish, corrupt, 
aggressive, jealous, stingy, cruel, error-prone, spiteful, bitter, cynical, 
arrogant, immature, impulsive, deceptive, stupid, unsophisticated, 
cunning, irrational, cold, unrefined (Table 2). The procedure exactly 
followed that of Experiments 1a and 1b. 
3.3.1.3. Design and planned data analysis. The design and planned data 
analysis was similar to the previous experiments but this time there were 
just two conditions, ingroup and outgroup target. A paired-samples t-test 
measured whether participants differentially attributed these undesir-
able characteristics to the two groups. The same analyses as in the 
previous studies examined differences in group preferences and dehu-
manization ratings. 
3.3.2. Results 
3.3.2.1. Main effect of group condition on (undesirable) trait attributions. 
Overall ratings were significantly higher for the outgroup (M = 44.3 ±
2.26) than the ingroup (M = 18.4 ± 1.30), t(129) = 12.09, p < .001, d =
1.06 (Fig. 1C). This showed participants tended to indicate that unde-
sirable traits, despite being high in ‘humanness’, were more typical of 
the outgroup than the ingroup. 
3.3.2.2. Differences in dehumanization and preference ratings for ingroup 
and outgroup. Once again, ratings were significantly higher for ingroup 
than outgroup both on the blatant dehumanization scale, t(129) = 8.86, 
p < .001, d = 0.78 and on the preference scale, t(129) = 15.02, p < .001, 
d = 1.32 (Fig. 2). 
3.3.3. Discussion 
This experiment demonstrated that participants rated undesirable 
but uniquely human words as more typical of outgroup members than 
Fig. 2. Blatant dehumanization and preference scores for ingroup and outgroup in Experiments 1a, 1b and 1c. Participants rated the political outgroup as less 
‘human-like’ than the ingroup across studies and all these differences were significant at p < .001. 
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ingroup members. The results support our view that apparent evidence 
for trait-based dehumanization can be better explained by ingroup 
preference. Though these results are not intuitively surprising, they 
highlight a need for fully separating effects of valence from effects of 
humanness in intergroup bias in trait attributions. Dovetailing with 
recent critiques of the dual model, we show that outgroups are perceived 
in uniquely human terms, though socially undesirable ones (Over, 
2020a; Over, 2020b). Previous evidence for trait-based dehumanization 
may at least in part be obscured by a conflation of ‘humanness’ with 
‘good’. As before, participants rated outgroup members as lower on the 
blatant dehumanization scale (Kteily et al., 2015) showing that this is 
the type of intergroup division where the trait-based accounts of dehu-
manization ought to predict preferential attribution of human traits to 
ingroup members. 
Taken together, these three experiments bring into doubt the argu-
ment that trait-based dehumanization (Haslam, 2006), is a distinct 
cognitive process from intergroup preference. In the next four experi-
ments, we test this more thoroughly by replicating the experiments in 
two further intergroup contexts and also including non-uniquely human 
traits (those shared with other species and robots) into the stimulus sets. 
4. Study 2: Measuring intergroup ascriptions of uniquely human 
and non-uniquely human traits (immigrant outgroup) 
4.1. Experiment 2a: Testing animalistic dehumanization against ingroup 
favouritism in the context of immigration 
In Study 2, we seek to replicate and extend our findings in another 
intergroup context. In this study, we measure whether there is evidence 
for trait-based dehumanization of the two types outlined by the dual 
model in the context of immigrants to the UK. We chose this intergroup 
context because of its social significance. Immigrant groups face sys-
tematic biases in multiple contexts, from discrimination by the police to 
employer hiring decisions, impacting important outcomes such as those 
relating to health and education (Fernández-Reino, 2019, 2020; Kauff, 
Wölfer, & Hewstone, 2017). Furthermore, previous research has sug-
gested that immigrants are often dehumanized, both blatantly, for 
example on the explicit dehumanization scale (Kteily et al., 2015; Kteily 
& Bruneau, 2017; Markowitz & Slovic, 2020), and more subtly, by being 
denied human specific mental states (Banton, West, & Kinney, 2020). 
In addition to replicating our findings, we also add a further 
manipulation in which we compare attribution of traits that vary in 
humanness (uniquely human or non-uniquely human) as well as in 
valence. We incorporated this factor so we could more thoroughly 
separate potential dehumanization effects as predicted by the dual 
model from effects of valence. It is possible that trait-based dehuman-
ization could be evidenced in an interaction between target group and 
humanness (with uniquely human words, but not non-uniquely human 
words ascribed more strongly overall to the ingroup than the outgroup, 
for example). Evidence for dehumanization of this sort could exist 
alongside, but independently of, valence effects. This design is also more 
consistent with prior related work (Hodson & Costello, 2007; Leyens 
et al., 2001; Viki et al., 2006). 
In Experiment 2a, we test whether there is evidence for animalistic 
dehumanization of immigrants when the valence of the trait terms used 
is controlled for. We compare how British participants attribute 
uniquely and non-uniquely human characteristics that vary orthogo-
nally in desirability (desirable/undesirable) differentially to immigrants 
and UK nationals who reside in the UK. The dual model predicts that in 
cases of animalistic dehumanization, uniquely human traits will overall 
typically be attributed more strongly to the ingroup than the outgroup. 
This should not be true of traits shared with other species. These inter-
action effects should be independent of trait valence. However, we 
predict that desirable traits will typically be attributed more strongly to 
the ingroup than outgroup and undesirable traits more strongly to the 
outgroup than the ingroup, regardless of perceived humanness. 
4.1.1. Methods 
4.1.1.1. Participants. A sample size calculation indicated that 126 par-
ticipants would be required to detect a medium effect size (partial eta2 
0.06) for the 2x2x2 interactions with power of 0.8 and alpha 0.05. We 
tested 130 participants. Two participants failed one or more attention 
checks and were excluded and replaced. In order to maximise our 
chances of finding evidence of trait based dehumanization if it occurs, 
we chose to only test people that self-identified as right-wing and that 
indicated they voted for Brexit in the 2016 referendum. This is because 
previous research has demonstrated that right-wing participants are 
particularly liked to dehumanize immigrants (Markowitz & Slovic, 
2020). Further, anti-immigration attitudes were widespread amongst 
Brexit supporters (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017; Meleady, Seger, & Ver-
mue, 2017). Participants were eligible if they were fluent in English, UK 
nationals and residents, voted Brexit, and indicated they affiliate to the 
right of the political spectrum. The final sample (61 female, 69 male) 
were aged between 22 and 78 (Mean age = 45.6, SD = 14.3). 
4.1.1.2. Materials. To create the stimuli, we chose trait words from our 
pretest data (Table 1) that best fit our four categories of interest: unique 
to humans and desirable, unique to humans and undesirable, shared 
with other species and desirable, and shared with other species and 
undesirable. To ensure our conceptions of trait desirability were accu-
rate, we separately asked thirty different participants to rate each of the 
sixty traits on a desirability scale. This asked participants to ‘indicate the 
extent to which you think the word in each of the following questions is 
a desirable character trait for someone to have.’ The bottom end of the 
slider (0) indicated the trait to be highly undesirable (a negative/bad 
quality to have), while the top end (100) indicated the trait to be highly 
desirable (a positive/good quality to have). Full results from these rat-
ings can be found in the OSF page (https://osf.io/yp8wc/) provided for 
this work. 
From both the most and least uniquely human traits compared to 
other species, we chose five that were desirable and five that were un-
desirable. Of the uniquely human category, the desirable traits were 
cultured, open-minded, civilised, sophisticated and knowledgeable, and 
undesirable traits were corrupt, controlling, arrogant, superficial and 
bitter. Of the traits shared with other species (least uniquely human), the 
desirable traits were energetic, trusting, curious, genuine and calm, and 
the undesirable traits were uncultured, unrefined, unsophisticated, 
stupid and inflexible (Table 3 shows the trait words included within each 
condition). In support of our experimental manipulations, paired sam-
ples t-tests showed that the mean of the uniquely human traits were 
rated as significantly more human than of those shared with other 
species, both for the desirable condition, t(29) = 9.44, p < .001, d =
1.72, and for the undesirable condition, t(29) = 8.88, p < .001, d = 1.62. 
Additionally, the desirable traits were rated as significantly more 
desirable than the undesirable traits, both for the uniquely human 
Table 3 
Trait items included for each condition in Studies 2 & 3.   









Desirable Cultured Energetic Generous Efficient 
Open-minded Trusting Open- 
minded 
Disciplined 
Civilised Curious Warm Helpful 
Sophisticated Genuine Kind Calm 
Knowledgeable Calm Moral Capable 
Undesirable Corrupt Uncultured Jealous Inflexible 
Controlling Unrefined Selfish Submissive 
Arrogant Unsophisticated Stingy Cold 
Superficial Stupid Impulsive Passive 
Bitter Inflexible Bitter Uncultured  
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condition, t(29) = 20.33, p < .001, d = 3.71, and for the non-uniquely 
human condition, t(29) = 19.13, p < .001, d = 3.49. 
We chose the items for our trait categories such that humanness 
ratings did not significantly differ between the desirable and undesirable 
conditions for each level of humanness. Importantly, humanness scores 
were comparable for desirable and undesirable traits that were unique to 
humans, t(29) = 0.002, p = .999, d < 0.001, BF01 = 5.14) and for 
desirable and undesirable traits shared with other species t(29) = 1.12, 
p = .274, d = 0.20, BF01 = 2.92. Also, desirability scores were compa-
rable for uniquely human and non-uniquely human traits that were 
desirable, t(29) = 1.34, p = .192, d = 0.24, BF01 = 2.30, and undesirable, 
t(29) = 1.14, p = .264, d = 0.21, BF01 = 2.86. This ensured that di-
mensions of Valence and Humanness were orthogonal, allowing us to 
accurately separate effects of each. 
The scales were almost identical to those described for Study 1. 
Participants indicated the extent to which they thought each trait word 
was typical of UK nationals (ingroup) and of immigrants (outgroup) 
within two blocks (one for each target group condition). For each item, 
participants indicated their response on a sliding scale from Not at all (0) 
to Very much so (100), with the midpoint Somewhat (50), though they 
could not see the actual numbers. For example, a block could begin ‘In 
the following questions, please consider the group: immigrants (to the 
UK from overseas)’. Then, participants would respond to each item, such 
as ‘Immigrants are typically corrupt’. The order of blocks was counter-
balanced evenly across participants such that half responded to the 
ingroup block first and half responded to the outgroup block first. The 
twenty items within block were randomised. One attention check per 
block was included approximately halfway through. Again, participants 
also completed the group preference and blatant dehumanization scales 
(Kteily et al., 2015). For both these attitude scales, the order of items 
(whether participants’ ingroup or outgroup was first) was counter-
balanced and accorded with order of presentation for the trait attribu-
tion blocks. 
4.1.1.3. Procedure. The procedure took an almost identical format to 
those outlined for Study 1. Participants were informed that the study 
was designed to help us understand the ways in which people ascribe 
character traits to different groups of individuals, UK nationals and 
immigrants. They were instructed that they would be asked to rate 
twenty trait words on two scales, one with reference to how typical the 
trait is of UK nationals and the other with reference to how typical the 
trait is to immigrants and then would be asked to complete two scales 
asking about attitudes towards each group. Informed consent, brief de-
mographics (age and gender) and screening (English fluency, political 
party identification, nationality and country of residence) questions 
were asked before participants were taken through the trait attribution 
questions. Participants then completed the group preference and blatant 
dehumanization scales before being debriefed and redirected for 
payment. 
4.1.1.4. Design and planned data analysis. There were three within- 
subjects variables each with two levels (target group membership: 
ingroup/outgroup; trait humanness: uniquely human/shared with other 
species; trait valence: desirable/undesirable). In line with our pre- 
registered analysis plan, we conducted a 2 (target group: ingroup/out-
group) x2 (trait humanness: uniquely human/shared with other species) 
x2 (trait valence: desirable/undesirable) within-subjects ANOVA to test 
for interactions between target group membership, valence and hu-
manness in intergroup trait attributions. 
Significant interactions were followed up with planned analyses of 
simple effects. As for all reported experiments, these always focussed 
only on differences in ratings between ingroup and outgroup targets, as 
central to our pre-registered hypotheses. We measured differences in 
preference and ‘blatant dehumanization’ ratings between ingroup and 
outgroup using paired-samples t-tests. 
4.1.2. Results 
Scores for each emotion category were obtained by calculating the 
mean of the five trait terms within each category for each participant. 
For example, a participant’s score for uniquely human desirable trait 
ascriptions towards the ingroup would be the mean of their ratings on 
cultured, open-minded, civilised, sophisticated and knowledgeable on 
the ingroup block. 
4.1.2.1. Main ANOVA: Interaction between target group, trait humanness 
and trait valence. A 2(target group: ingroup/outgroup) x 2 (humanness: 
uniquely human/shared with other species) x 2 (valence: desirable/ 
undesirable) within-subjects ANOVA tested for the interactions of in-
terest. There were significant two-way interactions between group and 
valence, F(1, 129) = 27.86, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.178, group and human-
ness, F(1, 129) = 10.23, p = .002, ηp2 = 0.073, and valence and hu-
manness, F(1, 129) = 11.24, p = .001, ηp2 = 0.080. The three-way 
interaction between group, humanness and valence was not signifi-
cant, F(1, 129) = 0.90, p = .346, ηp2 = 0.007. Planned simple effects 
comparisons following up the Group x Valence interaction showed that 
ratings were higher for ingroup than outgroup on desirable traits (p <
.001) but higher for outgroup than ingroup on undesirable traits (p =
.005). Simple effects comparisons following up the Group x Humanness 
interaction showed that ratings were higher for ingroup than outgroup 
on both uniquely human traits (p < .001) and those shared with other 
species (p = .002). 
Though the three-way interaction was not significant, we report the 
planned comparisons between ingroup and outgroup on each emotion 
condition so as to thoroughly assess both predictions and for consistency 
across experiments. Ratings were higher for ingroup than outgroup on 
desirable terms, both uniquely human and shared with other species (ps 
< 0.001), and higher for outgroup than ingroup on undesirable terms, 
both uniquely human (p = .037) and shared with other species (p =
.001) (Fig. 3A). 
4.1.2.2. Dehumanization and attitudes measures. Paired t-tests showed 
that participants indicated greater negative feeling to the outgroup than 
the ingroup, t(129) = 10.76, p < .001, d = 0.94. Participants also rated 
the outgroup as ‘less human’ than the ingroup on the blatant dehu-
manization scale, t(129) = 4.80, p < .001, d = 0.42 (Fig. 4). 
4.1.3. Discussion 
We tested for trait-based animalistic dehumanization of immigrants 
to the UK by right-wing Brexit supporters. In doing so, we replicated and 
extended results of Study 1 by including a further intergroup context. 
We also incorporated non-uniquely human as well as uniquely human 
trait words into our stimulus set, allowing us to measure intergroup 
attributions of traits that varied orthogonally on humanness and desir-
ability. We did not observe the pattern of results that would demonstrate 
animalistic dehumanization by the dual model account. We found that 
immigrants were ascribed desirable traits to a lesser extent but unde-
sirable traits to a greater extent than the ingroup, regardless of trait 
humanness. We replicated the pattern of results observed in Study 1 and 
showed again that intergroup biases in trait attribution are driven by 
valence rather than by humanness. Next, we tested for effects of 
mechanistic dehumanization in the same group context. 
4.2. Experiment 2b: Testing mechanistic dehumanization against ingroup 
favouritism in the context of immigration 
In Experiment 2b, we test whether there is evidence that immigrants 
are mechanistically dehumanized. We compared the extent to which 
participants attributed traits that varied on human uniqueness 
(compared to robots) and on desirability to immigrants and to UK na-
tionals living in the UK. The dual model predicts that in cases of 
mechanistic dehumanization, qualities that are characteristic of humans 
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(akin to those that distinguish humans from robots) will overall typically 
be attributed more strongly to the ingroup than to the outgroup. This 
should not be the case for traits shared with robots. These interaction 
effects should be independent of trait valence. However, we predict that 
desirable traits will typically be attributed more strongly to the ingroup 
than outgroup and undesirable traits more strongly to the outgroup than 
the ingroup, regardless of perceived humanness. If what appears to be 
evidence for trait-based dehumanization in previous research can better 
be described in terms of ingroup preference and stereotyping, then im-
migrants will tend to be attributed desirable traits less strongly and 
undesirable traits more strongly regardless of whether they are distinctly 
human traits or not. 
4.2.1. Methods 
4.2.1.1. Participants. As before, 130 participants were included. Eligi-
bility and exclusions criteria were the same as for Experiment 2a. Three 
people failed one or more attention checks and their data was excluded 
and replaced. The final sample (56 female, 74 male) were aged between 
22 and 80 (Mean age = 45.4, SD = 15.0). 
Fig. 3. Evidence for intergroup preference but not trait-based dehumanization in Experiments 2a (A) and 2b (B). Mean ratings were higher for the ingroup than for 
immigrants (outgroup) on desirable traits but higher for immigrants than for ingroup members on undesirable traits. This held both for traits perceived as uniquely 
human, and for those shared with other species/robots. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Fig. 4. Blatant dehumanization and preference scores for ingroup and outgroup 
in Experiments 2a and 2b. Participants rated immigrants as less ‘human-like’ 
than the ingroup across studies and all these differences were significant at p 
< .001. 
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4.2.1.2. 
The scale items were developed using a similar approach as for 
Experiment 2a. However, this time, instead of including words as being 
most and least unique to humans compared to other species, we included 
words that were most or least unique to humans compared to robots. 
From our pretest data (Table 1), we again chose trait words to represent 
the four categories of interest: unique to humans and desirable, unique 
to humans and undesirable, shared with robots and desirable, and 
shared with robots and undesirable. 
From both the most and least uniquely human terms compared to 
robots, we chose five that were desirable and five that were undesirable. 
Of the uniquely human category, the desirable traits were generous, 
open-minded, warm, kind and moral, and the undesirable traits were 
jealous, selfish, stingy, impulsive and bitter. Of the traits shared with 
robots (non-uniquely human), the desirable traits were efficient, disci-
plined, helpful, calm and capable, and the undesirable traits were 
inflexible, submissive, cold, passive and uncultured (Table 3 shows the 
traits included within each condition). In support of our experimental 
manipulations, paired t-tests showed that the combined means of the 
uniquely human traits were rated as significantly more human than of 
those shared with robots, both for the desirable, t(29) = 9.97, p < .001, 
d = 1.82, and for the undesirable, t(29) = 10.99, p < .001, d = 2.00, 
condition. Additionally, the desirable traits were rated as significantly 
more desirable than the undesirable traits, both for the uniquely human, 
t(29) = 16.62, p < .001, d = 3.03, and non-uniquely human, t(29) =
17.53, p < .001, d = 3.20, condition. 
We again chose the items for our trait categories such that human-
ness and valence could be measured as orthogonal factors. Humanness 
scores were comparable for desirable and undesirable traits that were 
unique to humans, t(29) = 1.02, p = .315, d = 0.19, BF01 = 3.19, and for 
desirable and undesirable traits shared with robots, t(29) = 0.42, p =
.676, d = 0.08, BF01 = 4.74. Desirability scores were comparable for 
uniquely human and non-uniquely human traits that were desirable, t 
(29) = 1.46, p = .155, d = 0.27, BF01 = 1.98, and undesirable, t(29) =
0.51, p = .612, d = 0.09, BF01 = 4.55. 
Other than including different trait items, the scales were identical as 
described for Experiment 2a. The procedure, design and planned data 
analysis were also identical as for Experiment 2a. 
4.2.2. Results 
4.2.2.1. Main ANOVA: Interaction between target group, trait humanness 
and trait valence. A 2(target group: ingroup/outgroup) x 2 (humanness: 
uniquely human/shared with robots) x 2 (valence: desirable/undesir-
able) within-subjects ANOVA tested for the interactions of interest. 
There were significant two-way interactions between group and 
valence, F(1, 129) = 69.22 p < .001, ηp2 = 0.349, valence and human-
ness, F(1, 129) = 50.39, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.281, but not between group and 
humanness, F(1, 129) = 0.08, p = .936, ηp2 < 001. Effects were qualified 
in a significant three-way interaction between group, humanness and 
valence, F(1, 129) = 21.40, p < .002, ηp2 = 0.142. Planned analyses of 
simple effects following the three-way interaction showed that ratings 
were higher for ingroup than outgroup on desirable terms, both 
uniquely human and shared with robots (ps < 0.001), and higher for 
outgroup than ingroup on uniquely human undesirable terms (p < .001). 
Although ratings were slightly higher for outgroup than ingroup on 
undesirable terms shared with robots, this did not reach significance (p 
= .085). 
4.2.2.2. Dehumanization and attitudes measures. Paired t-tests showed 
that participants indicated greater negative feeling to the outgroup than 
the ingroup, t(129) = 13.25, p < .001, d = 1.16. Participants also rated 
the outgroup as less ‘human’ than the ingroup on the blatant dehu-
manization scale, t(129) = 6.42, p < .001, d = 0.56 (Fig. 4). 
4.2.3. Discussion 
Experiment 2b extended results from Experiment 2a and showed no 
evidence for trait-based mechanistic dehumanization of immigrants. 
Instead, we found that immigrants were ascribed desirable traits to a 
lesser extent than ingroup members, regardless of perceived humanness. 
Immigrants were also ascribed undesirable human specific traits to a 
greater extent than the ingroup. However, there was only a marginal 
difference between immigrants and the ingroup for undesirable traits 
shared with robots. This last results may reflect the importance of ste-
reotypes and specific social context as well as ingroup preference effects 
in trait attributions (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). 
Taken together, the experiments suggest that trait-based dehuman-
ization does not occur in this context when trait valence is adequately 
controlled for. Rather, the observed pattern of results across Study 2 
suggests that immigrants tend to be attributed desirable qualities less 
strongly and undesirable qualities more strongly than ingroup members. 
One possible explanation for these results is that immigrants tend not 
to be dehumanized and, as a result, we did not observe the relevant 
differences in trait attribution. However, this explanation seems un-
likely. Prior research has reported dehumanization of immigrants in 
multiple contexts (Banton et al., 2020; Kteily & Bruneau, 2017; Mar-
kowitz & Slovic, 2020), showing this is the kind of group we should 
expect to see dehumanized should the process occur. We also chose a 
sample of self-identified right-wing Brexit supporters to maximise 
chances of detect dehumanization effects towards immigrants (Marko-
witz & Slovic, 2020). Further, we found that immigrants were explicitly 
dehumanized on the blatant dehumanization scale by this sample. Our 
results show that trait-based accounts do not accurately characterise the 
nature of dehumanization when trait valence is appropriately 
controlled. Taken together, results from Study 2 hold important real- 
world implications. Immigrants face systematic discrimination that is 
directly linked to negative life outcomes (Fernández-Reino, 2019, 2020; 
Kauff et al., 2017). It is important for society to accurately understand 
the mechanisms underlying discrimination of this sort. 
5. Study 3: Measuring intergroup ascriptions of uniquely human 
and non-uniquely human traits (criminal outgroup) 
5.1. Experiment 3a: Testing animalistic dehumanization against ingroup 
favouritism in the context of criminals 
In Study 3, we seek to replicate the findings from Study 2 in a third 
intergroup context. We do this in order to demonstrate the overarching 
challenge to the dual model and to test whether our alternative view 
generalises across multiple contexts. 
In this study, we measure whether there is evidence that criminals 
are animalistically and/or mechanistically dehumanized when trait 
desirability is controlled for. We chose criminals as the outgroup 
because previous research utilising the dual model framework has sug-
gested criminals are dehumanized along both dimensions. These studies 
show that the extent to which criminals are dehumanized has implica-
tions for sentencing judgements and support for rehabilitation pro-
grammes (Bastian et al., 2013; Viki et al., 2012). Therefore, 
understanding the specific mechanisms for biases in trait judgements 
towards criminals has important consequences within the criminal jus-
tice system and beyond. This intergroup context also meant we could 
widen the sample of participants belonging to the ‘ingroup’. This 
allowed us to confirm prior results were not limited by the specific 
samples included (UK Brexit/Remain supporters in Study 1, and UK 
right wing Brexiters in Study 2). 
The methods, analyses and predictions were the same as for Study 2. 
Animalistic dehumanization by the dual model account would be evi-
denced in uniquely human traits being attributed less strongly to crim-
inals than to the ingroup. However, this should not be the case for traits 
shared with animals. This effect of humanness should be independent of 
trait valence. However, as for prior studies, we predict that desirable 
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traits will typically be attributed more strongly to the ingroup than to 
criminals and undesirable traits more strongly to criminals than the 
ingroup, regardless of humanness. 
5.1.1. Methods 
5.1.1.1. Participants. As for previous studies, 130 participants were 
included. Participants were eligible to take part if they were fluent in 
English, eighteen or over and had not previously served a prison sen-
tence for committing a crime. Three participants failed one or more 
attention checks and their data was excluded and replaced. Participants 
were of a range of nationalities and residencies. The final sample (59 
female, 70 male, 1 ‘other’) were aged between 18 and 50 (Mean age =
25.4, SD = 7.3). 
5.1.1.2. Materials, procedure and design. Materials, procedure and 
design were exactly the same as for Experiment 2a though this time 
participants indicated the extent to which they thought each trait word 
was typical of ‘individuals with no criminal history’ (ingroup) and of 
‘individuals with criminal convictions’ (outgroup). For example, a block 
could begin ‘In the following questions, please consider the group: in-
dividuals with criminal convictions’. Then, participants would respond 
to each item, such as ‘individuals with criminal convictions are typically 
sophisticated’. As before, the order of blocks was counterbalanced 
evenly across participants. 
5.1.2. Results 
5.1.2.1. Main ANOVA: Interaction between target group, trait humanness 
and trait valence. A 2(target group: ingroup/outgroup) x 2 (humanness: 
uniquely human/shared with other species) x 2 (valence: desirable/ 
undesirable) within-subjects ANOVA tested for the interactions of 
interest. 
There were significant two-way interactions between group and 
valence, F(1, 129) = 143.20, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.526 and valence and 
humanness, F(1, 129) = 60.39, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.319, but not between 
group and humanness, F(1, 129) = 2.20, p = .140, ηp2 = 0.017. Effects 
were qualified in a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 129) = 9.18, p 
= .003, ηp2 = 0.066. Planned analyses of simple effects showed that 
ratings were significantly greater for ingroup than outgroup on desirable 
traits, both uniquely human and shared with other species, but signifi-
cantly greater for outgroup than ingroup on undesirable traits, both 
uniquely human and shared with other species (all ps < 0.001) (Fig. 5A). 
5.1.2.2. Dehumanization and attitudes measures. Paired t-tests showed 
that participants rated feeling more negatively towards the outgroup 
than the ingroup t(129) = 16.92, p < .001, d = 1.48, and also rated the 
outgroup as ‘less human’ than the ingroup on the blatant dehumaniza-
tion scale, t(129) = 7.02, p < .001, d = 0.62 (Fig. 6). 
Fig. 5. Evidence for intergroup preference but not trait-based dehumanization in Experiments 3a (A) and 3b (B). Mean ratings were higher for the ingroup than for 
criminals (outgroup) on desirable traits but higher for criminals than for ingroup members on undesirable traits. This held both for traits perceived as uniquely 
human, and for those shared with other species/robots. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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5.1.3. Discussion 
We tested for trait-based animalistic dehumanization of criminals by 
the general population. This directly replicated Experiment 2a in a 
different intergroup context. Again, we did not observe the pattern of 
results that would demonstrate animalistic dehumanization by the dual 
model account. Rather, criminals were consistently ascribed desirable 
traits to a lesser extent but undesirable traits to a greater extent than the 
ingroup, irrespective of trait humanness. These results are inconsistent 
with prior work reporting animalistic dehumanization of criminals 
(Bastian et al., 2013; Viki et al., 2012). Consistent with findings from 
Study 2, we showed that intergroup biases in trait attribution in the 
context of criminals are driven by valence rather than by humanness. 
Next, we tested for effects of mechanistic dehumanization in the same 
intergroup context. 
5.2. Experiment 3b: Testing mechanistic dehumanization against ingroup 
favouritism in the context of criminals 
In Experiment 3b, we extend results by measuring whether there is 
evidence that criminals are mechanistically dehumanized when trait 
desirability is controlled for. This experiment replicates Experiment 2b 
exactly other than including criminals as the outgroup and non- 
criminals as the ingroup. As before, mechanistic dehumanization of 
criminals would be shown in weaker attributions of qualities that are 
characteristic of humans (akin to those that distinguish humans from 
robots) relative to ingroup members. This should not be the case for 
qualities that are shared with robots. These effects should be indepen-
dent of valence. However, we predict that desirable traits will typically 
be attributed more strongly to the ingroup than to criminals and unde-
sirable traits more strongly to the criminals than the ingroup, regardless 
of perceived humanness. 
5.2.1. Methods 
5.2.1.1. Participants. As for previous studies, 130 participants were 
included. Participants were eligible to take part if they were fluent in 
English, eighteen or over and had not previously served a prison sen-
tence for committing a crime. Nine participants failed one or more 
attention checks and their data was excluded and replaced. Participants 
were of a range of nationalities and residencies. The final sample (71 
female, 57 male, 1 ‘other’ and 1 ‘prefer not to say’) were aged between 
18 and 69 (Mean age = 29.9, SD = 11.4). 
5.2.1.2. Materials, procedure and design. Materials, procedure and 
design were exactly the same as for Experiment 2b though this time 
participants indicated the extent to which they thought each trait word 
was typical of ‘individuals with no criminal history’ (ingroup) and of 
‘individuals with criminal convictions’ (outgroup), as for Experiment 3a. 
5.2.2. Results 
5.2.2.1. Main ANOVA: Interaction between target group, trait humanness 
and trait valence. A 2(target group: ingroup/outgroup) x 2 (humanness: 
uniquely human/shared with robots) x 2 (valence: desirable/undesir-
able) within-subjects ANOVA tested for the interactions of interest. 
There were significant interactions between group and humanness, F(1, 
129) = 19.19, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.129, group and valence, F(1, 129) =
136.55, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.514 and valence and humanness, F(1, 129) =
157.34, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.549. Effects were qualified by a significant 
three-way interaction, F(1, 129) = 104.50, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.448. Planned 
simple effects analyses showed that ratings were significantly greater for 
ingroup than outgroup on desirable traits, both uniquely human and 
shared with robots (ps < 0.001), but significantly greater for outgroup 
than ingroup on undesirable traits, both uniquely human (p < .001) and 
shared with robots (p = .016) (Fig. 5B). 
5.2.2.2. Dehumanization and attitudes measures. Paired t-tests showed 
that participants rated feeling more negatively towards the outgroup 
than the ingroup t(129) = 13.78, p < .001, d = 1.21 and also rated the 
outgroup ‘less human’ than the ingroup on the blatant dehumanization 
scale, t(129) = 6.84, p < .001, d = 0.60 (Fig. 6). 
5.2.3. Discussion 
Consistent with findings from Studies 1 and 2, we found no evidence 
for trait-based mechanistic dehumanization of criminals. Instead, 
criminals were ascribed desirable traits to a lesser extent than the 
ingroup and undesirable traits to a greater extent than the ingroup. 
These effects held for both uniquely human traits and for those 
perceived as shared with robots. Our results suggest that when desir-
ability of the human specific attributes is rigorously controlled for, 
apparent effects of trait-based dehumanization are better explained by a 
relative preference for the ingroup compared to criminals. Criminals 
were rated as ‘less human’ on the ascent of man scale, showing we 
should expect to see trait-based dehumanization should the process 
occur. 
Taken together, Study 3 calls into question prior work that reports 
dehumanization of criminals within the dual model framework (Bastian 
et al., 2013; Viki et al., 2012). These studies purportedly show that 
dehumanization of criminals predicts outcomes such as sentencing 
judgements and support for rehabilitation programmes. However, our 
results suggest these studies may not have accurately measured dehu-
manization. Rather, because of a desirability bias within the human 
specific attributions made, these studies are likely to have inadvertently 
measured dislike and negative feeling towards the offenders in question 
rather than dehumanization. Thus, it may be more accurate to conclude 
from these studies that negative feeling towards (rather than trait-based 
dehumanization of) certain offenders predicts judicial outcomes. Results 
from Study 3 are important because accurately understanding the 
mechanisms underlying biases in character judgements towards of-
fenders has implications for the success of criminal justice programmes. 
6. Analysis of combined data 
Taken together, the reported studies suggest that there is no support 
for the dual model of dehumanization in these intergroup contexts. 
However, a remaining possibility is that trait-based dehumanization 
does occur in these contexts, albeit with a smaller effect size than we 
were powered to detect. This seems unlikely as previous research on 
trait-based dehumanization has reported large effect sizes with fewer 
participants (e.g, Bain et al., 2009; Bastian et al., 2013; Loughnan & 
Haslam, 2007) and we pre-registered our sample size to detect medium 
Fig. 6. Blatant dehumanization and preference scores for ingroup and outgroup 
in Experiments 3a and 3b. Participants rated criminals as less ‘human-like’ than 
the ingroup across studies and all these differences were significant at p < .001. 
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effect sizes. Nevertheless, to investigate this possibility further, we 
conducted two exploratory analyses to determine whether there was any 
evidence for animalistic or mechanistic dehumanization when the data 
from studies 2 and 3 (which had an identical design) were combined. 
This resulted in two additional analyses each with a sample size of 260 
and power to detect interactions with a much smaller ηp2 of 0.03. 
A 2 (target group: ingroup/outgroup) x 2 (humanness: uniquely 
human/shared with other species) x 2 (valence: desirable/undesirable) x 
2(Experiment: 2a/3a) mixed ANOVA tested for interactions showing 
animalistic dehumanization as separable from ingroup preference. 
There were significant two-way interactions between group and 
valence, F(1, 258) = 124.17, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.325 and also between 
group and humanness, F(1, 258) = 10.68, p = .001, ηp2 = 0.040. Note that 
this 2 way interaction did not reflect the predictions of the dual model - 
ratings were higher for ingroup than outgroup on both uniquely human 
traits (p < .001) and those shared with other species (p = .028). 
Importantly, these effects were qualified in a three-way interaction be-
tween group, humanness and valence, F(1, 258) = 8.56, p = .004, ηp2 =
0.032. This showed that ratings were significantly greater for ingroup 
than outgroup on desirable traits, both uniquely human and shared with 
other species, but significantly greater for outgroup than ingroup on 
undesirable traits, both uniquely human and shared with other species 
(all ps < 0.001). The four-way interaction between group, humanness, 
valence and experiment was not significant, F(1, 258) = 2.90, p = .090, 
ηp2 = 0.011. 
A further 2 (target group: ingroup/outgroup) x 2 (humanness: 
uniquely human/shared with robots) x 2 (valence: desirable/undesir-
able) x 2(Experiment: 2b/3b) mixed ANOVA tested for interactions 
showing mechanistic dehumanization as separable from ingroup pref-
erence. There were significant two-way interactions between group and 
valence, F(1, 258) = 190.26, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.424 and also between 
group and humanness, F(1, 258) = 8.14, p = .005, ηp2 = 0.031. Note that 
once again this interaction did not reflect the predictions of the dual 
model - ratings were higher for ingroup than outgroup on both uniquely 
human traits and those shared with robots (p < .001). Importantly, these 
were qualified in a three-way interaction between group, humanness 
and valence, F(1, 258) = 108.49, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.296. These showed 
that ratings were significantly greater for ingroup than outgroup on 
desirable traits, both uniquely human and shared with robots (ps <
0.001), but significantly greater for outgroup than ingroup on undesir-
able traits, both uniquely human (p < .001) and shared with robots (p =
.004). The four-way interaction between group, humanness, valence and 
experiment was this time significant, F(1, 258) = 14.00, p < .001, ηp2 =
0.051. This interaction reflected the finding that in Experiment 2b 
(immigrant outgroup) attributions of undesirable traits shared with ro-
bots was only marginally greater for outgroup than ingroup (p = .068), 
whilst in Experiment 3b (criminal outgroup) this effect was stronger (p 
= .022). 
7. General discussion 
In this paper, we question the central claims of one of the most 
prominent psychological accounts of dehumanization - the dual model - 
which holds that outgroup members are perceived as lesser humans than 
ingroup members by being denied human specific traits (Haslam, 2006). 
We first revisited work relating to how the lay concept of ‘human’ is best 
characterised. We then tested its predictions about outgroup dehu-
manization in a series of seven experiments. Our results present a serious 
empirical challenge to the dual model. 
The dual model argues that there are two sense of humanness: 
human uniqueness and human nature. Uniquely human traits can be 
summarised as civility, refinement, moral sensibility, rationality, and 
maturity. Human nature traits can be summarised as emotional 
responsiveness, interpersonal warmth, cognitive openness, agency, and 
depth (Haslam, 2006). However, the traits that supposedly characterise 
‘humanness’ within this model are broadly socially desirable (Over, 
2020a; Over, 2020b). We showed that people also associate some un-
desirable traits with the concept ‘human’. As well as considering humans 
to be refined and cultured, people also consider humans to be corrupt, 
selfish and cruel. 
Results from our pretest provided us with grounds for re-examining 
predictions made by the dual model of dehumanization about the nature 
of intergroup bias in trait attributions. The dual model account holds 
that lesser attribution of human specific traits to outgroup members 
represents a psychological process of dehumanization that is separable 
from ingroup preference. However, as the human specific attributes 
summarised by the model are positive and socially desirable, it is 
possible that previous findings are better explained in terms of ingroup 
preference, the process of attributing positive qualities to ingroup 
members to a greater extent than to outgroup members. 
In seven highly-powered experiments, we tested the predictions of 
the dual model against this alternative. We pitted the two hypotheses 
against each other by comparing attributions of uniquely human traits 
that varied in whether they were socially desirable or undesirable to 
ingroup and outgroup members. The dual model holds that subtle 
dehumanization is evidenced by denying outgroup members uniquely 
human traits relative to ingroup members. We reasoned that whereas 
outgroup members may be denied desirable human traits, they are likely 
to be attributed undesirable human traits to a greater extent than 
ingroup members. 
Across three distinct intergroup contexts, we found no evidence for 
either animalistic or mechanistic dehumanization of outgroup members. 
Instead, we found strong and reliable intergroup preference effects. 
Desirable traits were ascribed more strongly to ingroup members than 
outgroup members and undesirable traits more strongly to outgroup 
members than ingroup members, irrespective of perceived humanness. 
A possible defence of the dual model account could be to argue that 
we chose three intergroup contexts in which animalistic and mechanistic 
dehumanization does not occur. However, we chose to investigate 
judgements of political opponents, immigrants and criminals specif-
ically because previous research has suggested that they are dehuman-
ized on a range of measures (Banton et al., 2020; Bastian et al., 2013; 
Markowitz & Slovic, 2020; Pacilli et al., 2016; Viki et al., 2013). In 
addition, we also showed in every experiment that outgroup members 
were explicitly rated as less human than were the ingroup on the blatant 
dehumanization scale (Kteily et al., 2015). Prior work shows that mea-
sures of animalistic and mechanistic dehumanization correlate posi-
tively with blatant dehumanization scores (Kteily et al., 2015). Though 
they are not claimed to measure the same construct, they have been 
shown to reliably co-occur. These findings confirm that these are the 
sorts of intergroup contexts in which we would expect to see trait-based 
dehumanization should the process occur. 
We acknowledge that without testing all possible intergroup con-
texts, it remains a possibility that some outgroups could be denied 
human specific attributes relative to ingroups even when valence is 
appropriately controlled for. In other words, it could be the case that 
trait-based dehumanization occurs independently of ingroup preference 
in some social settings. It may be particularly interesting for future 
research to investigate intergroup contexts that are not so strongly 
associated with competition, threat and animosity. 
However, the possibility that some, as yet untested, groups may be 
denied human unique attributes does not detract from the importance of 
our critique. To accurately measure trait-based dehumanization in 
future research, studies must consider the central role of valence. Prior 
work utilising the dual model framework has reported dehumanization 
to be extremely widespread in society, affecting not just marginalised 
groups but doctors, patients and even cyclists (Delbosc, Naznin, Haslam, 
& Haworth, 2019; Haslam & Stratemeyer, 2016). Rigorous measure-
ment and tighter experimental control may change some or all of the 
conclusions from previous research. 
Across our experiments, we observed strong intergroup preference 
effects, with desirable traits more strongly ascribed to the ingroup and 
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undesirable traits more strongly to the outgroup. Our results demon-
strate both ingroup favouritism (assigning greater positivity to the 
ingroup) and outgroup derogation (assigning greater negativity to the 
outgroup) (Brewer, 1999; Hewstone et al., 2002). However, we also 
suggest that group specific stereotypes are likely to play an important 
role in these processes. In many social contexts, trait attributions may 
reflect social stereotyping as well as intergroup preferences (Fiske et al., 
2002). For example, previous work suggested that Anglo-Australians 
were ‘animalistically’ dehumanized both by themselves and by Ethnic- 
Chinese participants, whilst Ethnic-Chinese people were ‘mechanisti-
cally’ dehumanized both by themselves and by Anglo-Australians (Bain 
et al., 2009). These effects may be more compatible with stereotype 
content than with trait-based dehumanization. Future work would 
benefit from addressing the distinction between stereotyping and trait- 
based dehumanization. 
An outstanding question relates to whether other psychological 
models of dehumanization more accurately capture the ways in which 
different social groups are perceived. For example, infrahumanisation 
theory predicts that people tend to believe ingroup members experience 
uniquely human emotions more strongly than do outgroup members 
(Leyens et al., 2000, 2001). It would be valuable for future research to 
examine the utility of this theory by testing whether participants 
perceive ingroup members to experience human emotions more strongly 
overall or whether they perceive ingroup members to experience pro-
social emotions more strongly but outgroup members to experience 
antisocial emotions more strongly. Further work could helpfully inves-
tigate how these findings bare on the claim that outgroups are some-
times dehumanized by being denied mental states (Harris & Fiske, 
2006). 
Taken together, our studies suggest that the dual model does not 
accurately characterise the ways in which outgroups are perceived in at 
least the social contexts examined here – political groups, immigrants 
and criminals. Prejudice and discrimination are pressing social prob-
lems. If psychological research is to contribute to the interdisciplinary 
mission to reduce prejudice and encourage more egalitarian behaviour, 
then it must start by accurately characterising the psychological biases 
underlying discriminatory behaviour. We suggest that the dual model of 
dehumanization conflates apparent evidence for dehumanization with 
ingroup preference. As a result, it may obscure more than it reveals 
about the psychology of intergroup bias. 
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